Inferior Number Sentencing - full reasons for the sentencing decision
delivered 19th January 2018
[2018]JRC050
Royal Court
(Samedi)
5 March 2018
Before :
|
Sir William Bailhache, Bailiff, and Jurats
Grime and Christensen
|
The Attorney General
-v-
B
R. C. P. Pedley, Esq., Crown Advocate.
Advocate M. T. Jowitt for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
THE BAILIFF:
1.
On Friday
19th January the Court sentenced the defendant, who was 18 at the
date of sentence but 17 at the date the offence was committed, to 200 hours
community service on one count of causing serious injury by dangerous driving
contrary to Article 23A(1) of the Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956
(“the Law”). The Court indicated that if it had passed a custodial
sentence, that sentence would have been one of 14 months’ youth
detention. In addition the
defendant was disqualified for a period of four years. The Court indicated that full reasons
for the sentencing decision would be delivered later, and this judgment
contains those reasons.
The circumstances of the offence
2.
On 12th
May, 2017, the defendant collected four friends from a property in the Maufant
area at around 11.30pm. He had not
been drinking. He was driving a
Ford Fiesta motor car. His route
took him along La Grande Route de St Martin and Bagatelle Road, heading towards
Mont Millais. One of the passengers
was not wearing a safety belt – not because he made no effort to do so,
but because he could not find the clip, and he accordingly held the belt across
his shoulder. All four passengers
described the defendant driving too fast on the road from Midland Stores
towards Five Oaks, noting that the wheels spun when setting off and that the
engine was revved excessively. One
passenger felt the defendant was showing off. Two of them asked the defendant to slow
down several times but he did not do so.
3.
The
defendant left the Five Oaks roundabout driving down Bagatelle Road at
approximately 53 miles per hour. As
the car approached the playing fields by St Saviour’s School, it started
to skid. The car hit the left hand pavement as the defendant failed to make the
corner, and then, as he turned the steering wheel sharply right, it veered
across the other side of the road before hitting the right hand pavement. One of the passengers describes the
defendant as “fighting the steering
wheel”.
4.
The Fiesta
collided almost head on with an oncoming silver Mercedes travelling up
Bagatelle Road in the opposite direction. The driver of that car had no time to
brake before the collision but fortunately he escaped the crash with only minor
abrasions. One witness described it
as “a really really high speed
collision” and the other, a taxi driver of several years’
experience, said that he was “absolutely
shocked at the speed” at which the defendant was driving and that it was
“extremely dangerous and probably
some of the worst I have ever seen”.
5.
Paramedics
arrived, as well as technicians and members of the Police and Fire
Service. We have seen copies of the
photographs taken which show very significant damage to the front of the Ford
Fiesta car driven by the defendant.
The Fire Service had to remove the passenger door in order to gain
access to one of the passengers.
Injuries
6.
The
defendant was very fortunate. He
was able to get out of his vehicle after the collision. He had a bruise across his nose, but,
perhaps surprisingly, he was otherwise unhurt. One of his passengers was able to exit
the car by himself after the collision, being in shock and, according to him,
“panicking like a headless chicken”. He complained of pain to the left hip
and both shoulders, had some muscular tenderness and was treated for
whiplash. He was discharged from
the hospital after a couple of hours.
The other passengers had more serious injuries. The front seat passenger had fractures to
his arm and fingers, for which he was treated at Accident and Emergency before
being discharged some 7 hours later on 13th May. The third passenger, sitting in the rear
seat in the middle, suffered a broken leg and dislocated shoulder. His injuries
may have been exacerbated by the fact that he was not wearing a seatbelt
because he could not find the seatbelt clip. He was admitted to Accident and Emergency
at 12.55am, given morphine for the pain he was suffering and he underwent
surgery later that day. He underwent
a blood transfusion a few days later and was discharged on 19th
May. The last of the passengers who
was sitting in the rear seat on the right hand side, suffered a broken wrist
and nose. He did not recall getting
out of the car but he did remember sitting on the pavement after the
collision. He was admitted to
Accident and Emergency and discharged at 8.22am later that morning.
7.
The
defendant was interviewed in the presence of his mother and legal
representative and answered “no
comment”. He was interviewed
again approximately six weeks later and his representative then read out a
statement on his behalf to the effect that he accepted he was the driver,
accepted full responsibility for the accident, was sorry for it and sorry that
people had been injured. He
accepted his driving was careless within the meaning of the law. He went on to give a further no comment
interview. Subsequently the
defendant was charged with causing serious injury by dangerous driving, to
which he entered a not guilty plea, although indicating that he would plead
guilty to causing serious injury by careless driving. An expert report was commissioned by the
prosecution, which was produced on 7th November. It concluded that the defendant’s
vehicle was travelling at 53 miles per hour. When the defendant was indicted on that
charge in the Royal Court on 24th November, he entered a guilty
plea.
Aggravating circumstances
8.
Weather
conditions were poor and the road wet but the defendant nonetheless drove his
Ford Fiesta car at an excessive speed.
He was inexperienced and he disregarded warnings from his passengers to
slow down. There was a suggestion
that he might have been showing off.
Mitigating factors
9.
As
indicated above, the defendant was 17 at the date of the accident and 18 at the
date of sentence. As such, Articles
4 and 4A of the Criminal Justice (Young Offenders) (Jersey) Law 2014
(“the 2014 Law”) apply.
Furthermore, his youth is of itself a mitigating factor in so far as
concerns sentence.
10. The defendant pleaded guilty on indictment in
the Royal Court and had made earlier admissions before he was charged in the
Magistrate’s Court. His
guilty plea to the more serious charge was entered as soon as the Crown
provided evidence of his speed.
11. The defendant is of good character. In particular he has no previous driving
convictions. In addition he has the
support of his family. He produced
some good references and wrote a letter of remorse to the Court as well.
12. As far as we are aware, this is the first
occasion on which this Court has had to consider the appropriate sentence for
an offence under Article 23A of the Law.
We note that this offence of causing serious injury by dangerous
driving, together with the offences of causing death by careless driving and
causing serious injury by careless driving were introduced by the Road
Traffic (No. 62) (Jersey) Regulations 2015. The current offence carries a maximum
sentence of imprisonment of 5 years and an unlimited fine.
13. “Serious injury” is defined in
the Law but for present purposes, it is the fracture of bones (except simple
fractures of fingers, toes or nose) which counts as a serious injury for the
purposes of the Law.
Guidelines
14. We were shown the Magistrate’s Court
guidelines for some of these offences which may have been formulated on the
basis of English guidelines. We
think they give rise to some difficulties.
For example, when considering the instant offence of dangerous driving
causing serious injury, one section which is descriptive of the nature of
activity in question contains this language:-
“Single incident where little
or no damage or could be regarded as a serious example of careless
driving”.
15. It seems to us that if the description of
driving is that of a serious example of careless driving, that description does
not fit the offence which is being sentenced.
16. The Crown also put before us the definitive
guideline in relation to causing death by driving, issued by the Sentencing
Guidelines Council in the United Kingdom.
In so far as the guidelines give proposed starting points, we find them
unhelpful but to the extent that these guidelines provide a structure for
assessing the seriousness of the driving, we think that they are useful. We were also shown a number of cases
– R v Ellis (Johnathon James) 2014 WL 1219262, a case of causing
serious injury by dangerous driving where the defendant was sentenced to two
years’ imprisonment; R v Dewdney [2014] EWCA Crim 1722 where the
defendant pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by dangerous driving and was
sentenced to 32 months’ imprisonment. He was also given a concurrent sentence
of 4 months for driving with excess alcohol in his blood. We were also referred to R v Aziz
[2016] EWCA Crim 1945, where on a guilty plea to the offence of causing serious
injury by dangerous driving a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment and a
three year disqualification was upheld on appeal. Perhaps the closest case in factual
terms to which we were referred was R v Passon [2016] EXCA Crim 1992
where a 25 year old appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment
for the offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving and disqualified
for 3 years, and again the appeal against sentence was dismissed. Finally we were referred to R v
Jenkins [2015] EWCA Crim 105 where two consecutive sentences of 3
years’ imprisonment were imposed for separate offences of causing serious
injury by dangerous driving and R v Rimmer [2015] EWCA Crim 490 where on
the same charge a sentence of 33 months with a 5 year disqualification was
imposed and upheld on appeal; and R v Dicken [2017] EWCA Crim 530 where
a driver who was 16 at the date of the offence was sentenced to 4½ years
youth detention on a charge of causing death by dangerous driving and 2 years 4
months concurrent on a second count of causing serious injury by dangerous
driving. For technical reasons the
sentence on the second count in that case was quashed and no separate penalty
imposed.
17. The Sentencing Council in England and Wales has
published guidelines in relation to sentencing policy where dealing with the
offence of dangerous driving, and a definitive guideline in the case of the
offence of causing death by dangerous driving. It is to be remembered at all times when
looking at guidelines issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council that the
statutory regime for sentencing in England and Wales is not the same as that
which exists in Jersey and accordingly no helpful guidance can be taken from
the actual figures which are to be found in those guidelines even though the
maximum sentence under the English statutory provision creating the offence may
be the same as the maximum sentence under the equivalent Jersey statutory
provision. Furthermore, one assumes
that the Sentencing Guidelines Council must have regard to the figures which have
been published as guidelines across a wide range of offending, thus keeping the
sentences for comparable criminal behaviour in some sort of balance, even
though it might be difficult to make any sensible comparison between the
criminality of an indecent assault and of causing serious bodily injury by
dangerous driving. Nonetheless,
despite these reservations over the sentences recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines Council, the analysis of aggravating or mitigating factors is almost
invariably helpful and the classification of the types of driving can also be
useful. Thus, for example, in
relation to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving, there are three
levels of seriousness which the Sentencing Guidelines Council identifies and
which we would respectfully adopt – level one, which are the most serious
offences encompassing driving that involved a deliberate decision to ignore (or
a flagrant disregard for) the rules of the road and an apparent disregard for
the great danger being caused to others; level two, which is described as
driving that created a substantial risk of danger; and level three which
is described as driving that created a significant risk of danger.
Discussion
18. It seems to us that we must have in mind when
approaching sentencing for the offence now under consideration the three
comparable offences – dangerous driving for which the maximum sentence is
two years imprisonment or an unlimited fine; dangerous driving causing serious
injury, for which the maximum sentence is 5 years’ imprisonment and a
fine; and causing death by dangerous driving for which the maximum sentence is
14 years’ imprisonment and a fine.
We should also have regard to the offence of causing death by careless
driving, for which the maximum sentence is 5 years’ imprisonment and a
fine, and causing serious injury by careless driving for which the maximum
sentence is imprisonment for a term of 2 years and a fine, noting that if the
careless driving causing serious injury occurs when under the influence of
drink or drugs, the maximum sentence is increased to 4 years’
imprisonment. Finally we note that
the offence of careless driving carries a fine at level three. What is apparent from the statutory
framework is that the legislature has identified two different forms of driving
which are to be classed as criminal – dangerous driving and careless
driving. It is also apparent from
the different offences that the legislature classes the consequences of the
driving as an important ingredient in determining the prospective penalty. We
will consider both issues separately.
19. When the Law was first passed by the States,
the offence of dangerous driving was framed in this way:-
“If any person drives a
vehicle … on a road or other public place at a dangerous speed or in a
dangerous manner, he shall be liable …”
20. Interestingly, the penalty when first
prescribed in 1956 for that offence was a fine not exceeding £25, or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month; and in the case of a second or
subsequent conviction, a fine not exceeding £100 or imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year.
21. The offence of careless driving was framed in
1956 when first adopted in this way:-
“If a person drives a vehicle
on a road without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration
for other persons using the road, he shall be guilty of an offence.”
22. A
first conviction for that offence rendered the offender liable to be
disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence for up to one month but it
appears there was no other penalty.
23. The offence of careless driving is defined in
similar terms today, albeit the penalty has been increased. However, for some reason in 1999 the
States amended the provisions for dangerous driving so that the statutory
offence is simply committed where a person drives a vehicle (other than a
wheelchair) dangerously on a road or other public place. At Article 24, the Law contains a
definition of what it is to drive “dangerously” which is similar
in effect to Section 2A of the English Act, albeit framed in slightly
reshuffled language.
24. Under the Road Traffic Act 1988 in
England and Wales, Section 2A provides a definition:-
“(1) … a person is to
be regarded as driving dangerously if (and, subject to sub-section (2) below,
only if) –
(a) The way he drives falls far
below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and
(b) It would be obvious to a
competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous.
(2) A person is also to be regarded
as driving dangerously … if it would be obvious to a competent and
careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be
dangerous.
(3) … “dangerous”
refers to danger either of injury to any person or of serious damage to
property; and in determining for the purposes of those sub-sections what would
be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful driver in a particular
case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could be
expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within
the knowledge of the accused.
(4) In determining for the purposes
of sub-section (2) above the state of a vehicle, regard may be had to anything
attached to or carried on or in it and to the manner in which it is attached or
carried.”
25. As in England, the test of what is dangerous
driving concentrates on the nature of the driving albeit the defendant’s
state of mind can also be relevant, so that the defendant’s driving is
measured against that which would be expected of a competent and careful
driver. It seems to us that that
brings into play an assessment of the driving on the particular piece of road
on which the driving took place, the road conditions at the time, the condition
of the vehicle and possibly other circumstances of which the driver would be
expected to be aware, such as the carrying of passengers or perhaps the special
needs of particular passengers – for driving in a particular way might
not be regarded as generally dangerous but might become dangerous if, for
example, one of the passengers was heavily pregnant.
26. Consideration of what is the focus of the
offence informs the approach the Court should take to sentence.
27. What we can also say is that driving at a
dangerous speed is unquestionably driving dangerously and that was the position
in this case.
28. The different driving offences we have
described make it plain that the sentence which can be imposed will vary
according to the consequences of the driving. This is in some respects wholly a matter
of chance. The dangerous driving may or may not result in an accident; the
accident may or may not result in serious injury; or even death. The culpability of the defendant seems
to us to be broadly the same whatever the consequences. When one has regard to
what are generally considered to be the three classic purposes of sentencing
– to punish, to deter or to rehabilitate – it is not obvious that
any of these objectives are achieved by the creation of statutory offences the
commission of which is a matter of chance, or bad luck as far as a defendant
(and probably the victim) are concerned.
His dangerous driving, followed by a collision, caused a passenger in
the other car to suffer a broken nose, and he is liable to two year’s
imprisonment. The same driving and
the same collision caused the passenger in the other car to suffer a broken
wrist and he is liable to five years’ imprisonment.
29. This is uncomfortable territory for a
sentencing court. It seems to us
that the legislature has adopted these particular criminal offences with the
different penalties which they carry only to reflect the consequences to the
victim or victims of the offending which, in a sense, could be argued to
transfer the gravamen of the offence from the driving to the consequences.
30. While it seems to us to be not entirely logical
to suggest that, in every case, the worse the driving, the higher the risk of
serious injury, there probably is a correlation between the two at least to
some extent. Against that
background, it is interesting to look at the injuries suffered in the English
cases referred to us. Although the
injuries suffered in the present case were not at all pleasant, it has to be
recognised immediately that in the English cases, for the most part, the
injuries were of a different scale altogether. In Ellis, the injured
driver (not the defendant) sustained a fractured skull and an open compound
fracture of her ankle. At the time
of sentencing, ten months after the accident, she was still suffering from
physical and neurological injuries and was in great pain. Her sight was affected. She had to wear a leg brace. Her ability to walk was affected and she
could no longer drive. Her injuries
meant she could no longer work or run the care home which she had run for 22
years, and her registration to do so had therefore been withdrawn. She told the judge that her life had
been turned upside down.
31. In Dewdney, the consequences for the
female rear seat passenger, who had to be freed from the vehicle by emergency
services, were that she sustained a brain haemorrhage, bilateral contusions of
the lungs, several fractures of the thoracic spine with bleeding around the
spine and heart. There was a large
wound to her scalp which required stitching. Following surgery to her back she had
been left with rods permanently inserted. These were visible and resulted in
scarring. In addition there were
fractures of her clavicle and chest bones.
Another passenger suffered one fractured and three crushed vertebrae and
a fractured spine.
32. In Aziz, the injuries were less serious
– one victim suffered a shattered right wrist which had to be plated and
pinned, a fracture of the bone in his left hand, a fractured nose and bruising
to other parts of his body. Other
passengers suffered serious bruising.
33. In Passon, notwithstanding that the
driving was not dissimilar to the driving in the instant case, the injuries
sustained by the victim were horrific. She suffered traumatic brain injury,
cerebral swelling, sub-arachnoid haemorrhage and subdural haemorrhage,
cognitive impairment including slurring of speech and mild to moderate right
side weakness, mild memory recall difficulties, weakness and stiffness in the
right arm, loss of balance and an inability to walk unaided for a time. She had bilateral lung contusions, a
right pneumothorax, a right haemo-thorax, pubic rami-fractures and a soft
tissue injury to the right shoulder. Nonetheless, it appeared that she had by
the time of sentencing returned to work part time and she was expected to make
a full recovery within a further twelve months.
34. In Jenkins, the injuries sustained by
two of the victims were very significant. One had a broken arm, an open below the
knee fracture to his leg, a fractured ankle which required pinning, tow
fractured ribs and a fractured hip.
Part of his calf muscle had to be removed from his leg and he required
skin grafts. He was confined to a wheelchair for a considerable time and at
sentence was still only able to walk with a stick.
35. His wife had a broken arm which required
plating. She had seven broken ribs,
a punctured lung, internal bleeding, damage to her shoulder, nerve damage and a
puncture wound around her knee. She was in intensive care for two days and in a
high dependency unit for a further three days.
36. In Rimmer, the victim had to be cut out
of the car by the emergency services. She had been impaled by a section of post
and rail fencing. The medical evidence recorded that on admission to the
hospital she had a “massive wooden post from the right proximal
femoral area to the right, exists posterior aspect of the left buttock”. In total her injuries included a serious
injury to her pelvis; detached ovaries; muscle graft from her left thigh to her
lower calf; a broken left ankle; broken left hand; nerve transplant from her
right calf to her right thigh; and a severe bowel injury. A section of the bowel had to be removed
and a colostomy bag was fitted for six months until the bowel could be
reconnected. At the time of
sentence, it was not known whether she would be able to have children in the
future.
37. In Dickin, one victim suffered
catastrophic injuries and died the following day. The other suffered serious
injuries including deep gashes to his head, a broken jaw, a severed tongue, the
loss of teeth, a fractured wrist and ligament damage.
38. Under Article 26C of the Law, there is a
definition of “serious injury”. It means an injury that:-
(a) Requires hospitalisation for more than 48
hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received;
(b) Results in the fracture of any bone, except
simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose;
(c) Involves lacerations which cause severe
haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage;
(d) Involves injury to any internal organ; or
(e) Involves second or third degree burns, or any
burns affecting more than 5% of the body’s surface.
39. That definition takes one, as it were, over the
threshold for the offence to be committed, but even once passed, it is clear
that there are different degrees of injury which nonetheless would fall within
that definition – for example, a broken leg can be expected, in normal
circumstances, to mend, but there will be other serious injuries that might
leave the victim permanently incapacitated, and at worst in a permanent coma,
or bedridden or in a wheelchair.
40. We take from the analysis of this legislation
that the Court is required to have regard to the principle that the degree of
injury sustained by victim is a relevant component in the sentence which the
Court should impose – that must be so because otherwise there is no
difference for sentencing purposes, between dangerous driving and dangerous
driving causing serious injury.
41. Nonetheless, fairness in sentencing requires
that close consideration be given to the nature of the criminal conduct of the
defendant and, for the reasons given in paragraph 28 above, not focussing predominantly
upon the consequences suffered. The
first task of the Court is to consider the nature of the driving because just
as there are degrees of seriousness in “serious injury”
there are also degrees of bad driving in dangerous driving. The most significant obligation of the
Court in sentencing for the current offence is to make an assessment of the
defendant’s driving against the standard of driving of a competent and
careful driver, for that is what essentially fixes his culpability. The Court then has regard to the
consequences of his driving to ensure that the sentence which is imposed pays
proper respect to the principle set out in paragraph 40 above.
42. We expressed earlier some reservations about
the Magistrate’s Court guidelines in relation to dangerous driving,
whether this is concerned with dangerous driving simpliciter or dangerous
driving causing serious injury.
Under Category A, the description is “single instant where little or no
damage, or could be regarded as a serious example of careless driving”. We think that it is hard to justify a
starting point of 9 months imprisonment for a single incident which could be
regarded as a serious example of careless driving where, if careless driving
had been charged without injury, the maximum sentence would be a fine. There is a qualitative difference
between careless driving and dangerous driving, and this categorisation does
not seem to recognise it. Similarly
in Category B – “incident(s) involving excessive speed
…” does not seem to distinguish between driving at a
dangerous speed which might fall into Category A, and driving at a dangerous
speed which is firmly in the more serious category. In our view, the categorisation of
driving by the Sentencing Guidelines Council when considering the offence of
causing death by dangerous driving is perhaps a more helpful categorisation of
the different kinds of dangerous driving.
Application to this case
43. The defendant was driving at an excessive speed
in a residential area at approximately midnight on wet roads. The speed limit was 30 miles per hour
and he was driving at 53mph. The
driving had taken place over a distance of approximately one mile, in the early
part of which the speed limit had been 40pmh. One or more of the passengers had asked
him to slow down several times, but he had not done so. As a result of the speed at which he was
driving, the road conditions and no doubt in part his own inexperience, the
defendant lost control of the car and an accident took place in which three
passengers in this car suffered injuries which amount to serious injury for the
purposes of Article 23A of the Law. Although serious injuries, they were for
the most part injuries which fall at the bottom end of the serious injury
spectrum – for the avoidance of doubt they remain serious, but one has to
recognise that the injuries could have been much worse. Indeed the defendant is lucky that they
were not worse, and lucky that none were fatal. The injuries sustained by the passengers
came at a bad time for them – some were imminently to be taking
examinations for AS level, and all were in the course of their A level
studies. They have been adversely
affected, as is plain from the victim personal statements which have been filed
with us, and which we have read carefully.
44. The Crown submitted that the offending fell
between the most serious and the middle category of offending on the
Magistrate’s Court sentencing guidelines for dangerous driving. We do not agree with that. In our view, the driving as described to
us, was dangerous driving, but fell in the least serious category. The defendant was driving too fast. If one were looking at the Sentencing
Council guidelines in England and Wales, the offence seriousness would fall in
the middle category – an incident involving excessive speed in a built-up
area. If one were looking at the
guidelines for causing death by dangerous driving in England and Wales, it was
driving that fell into level 3, namely the least serious category, as driving
that created a significant risk of danger, characterised by driving above the
speed limit/at a speed that was inappropriate for the prevailing conditions.
45. Given the maximum sentence of five years
imprisonment, had we been dealing with an adult offender, we would have
considered that a sentence of one year’s imprisonment would have been the
initial point to take in this case.
46. One then has regard to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The
offending was aggravated by the fact that more than one person was injured, and
by the disregard of warnings from the passengers that he should slow down. It is also aggravated by the suggestion
that there was an element of bravado to the defendant’s driving because
he was revving the engine. In terms
of mitigation, there is the guilty plea, his remorse and his previous good
character, the fact that one of the victims was a close friend of his, and that
he was an inexperienced driver, unable to handle the loss of control when the
car started to skid.
47. At the time of handing down the sentence, the
Court indicated that serious injury had been caused and it could have been much
worse. The effect on the passengers
was very much taken into account.
Nothing said in this judgment detracts from that. This was bad driving at an excessive
speed in a residential area with an element of bravado to it. We consider that had we been dealing with
an adult offender, we would have imposed a sentence of fourteen months
imprisonment.
48. However, this offender is one to whom the 2014
Law applies. The Court should not
pass a sentence of youth detention unless there has been a history of failure
to respond to non-custodial penalties or an inability or unwillingness to do
so; or that only a custodial sentence will be adequate to protect the public
from serious harm; or that the totality of offending or the offence is so
serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified. None of those features apply, and
accordingly the Court imposed a sentence of 200 hours community service.
49. The Crown moved for a disqualification period
of three years in respect of the defendant’s holding or obtaining a
driving licence. After consideration, we resolved to increase that to four
years. This reflects our assessment
of the relative immaturity of the defendant and the need for him to understand
that while driving a car is a great convenience, it also leaves the driver in a
position of great responsibility towards other members of the community. This defendant needs to gain maturity in
order to appreciate that fully. He
may do so in less than four years, and there is power in this Court to lift the
period of disqualification on an application by the defendant. Whilst not encouraging him to do so, we
indicate that he should certainly not attempt to do so until three years have
gone by and at that time one would still want to be satisfied that he then
demonstrated the maturity which has been lacking on this occasion.
Authorities
Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956.
Criminal Justice (Young Offenders)
(Jersey) Law 2014.
Road Traffic (No. 62) (Jersey)
Regulations 2015.
R v Ellis (Johnathon James) 2014 WL
1219262.
R v Dewdney
[2014] EWCA Crim 1722.
R v Aziz [2016] EWCA Crim 1945.
R v Passon [2016] EXCA Crim 1992.
R v Jenkins
[2015] EWCA Crim 105.
R v Rimmer [2015] EWCA Crim 490.
R v Dicken [2017] EWCA Crim 530.
Road Traffic Act 1988